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Can an experiment be replicated in a mechanical fashion without considering the
processes underlying the initial results? Here I will consider a non-replication of Saccade
Induced Retrieval Enhancement (SIRE) and argue that it results from focusing on
statistical instead of on substantive process hypotheses. Particularly the theoretical
integration of SIRE with Eye-Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR)
therapy, provides clues about when the memory enhancement should occur. A relatively
large memory enhancement effect in participants with a consistent (i.e., extreme right
or left) handedness should be observed, (a) when explicitly instructed to retrieve
and imagine the memories during the eye manipulation, and (b) for emotionally
negative material. A finer theoretical analysis may thus well explain the contrast
between the original SIRE studies and the non-replication. Also the findings from
preregistered confirmatory research (i.e., focusing solely on statistical hypotheses)
should be considered preliminary, representing shifts on a gradual scale of evidence,
and awaiting interpretation in terms of theoretical hypotheses. Stronger, but still not
definitive, conclusions can better be postponed until after multi-study meta-analyses
with theoretically motivated moderator variables have been performed.
Keywords: confirmatory research, replication, eye movements, SIRE, EMDR, hypothesis-guided research
“There are many hypotheses in science which are wrong. That’s perfectly all right; they’re the aperture
to finding out what’s right. Science is a self-correcting process. To be accepted, new ideas must survive
the most rigorous standards of evidence and scrutiny.”
Carl Sagan (1990, Cosmos: A Personal Voyage, Heaven, and Hell [Episode 4] 33 min 20 s)
Many published research findings are undoubtedly ‘false’ (i.e., incorrect), also when bias or
questionable research practices (QRPs) are completely absent (Ioannidis, 2005). An even larger
number cannot be reproduced in replication research (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). To
remedy this undesirable situation, Wagenmakers et al. (2012) advocated that researchers should
preregister their studies and specify their statistical tests in advance (i.e., “confirmatory” research).
Only for this type of purely confirmatory research would the common statistical tests be valid.
Although these authors note that there is nothing wrong with their other type of research (i.e.,
“exploratory” research), as long as this is explicitly acknowledged, they do associate exploratory
research with “wonky” statistics. Confirmatory research procedures may to some extent be able to
reduce bias and QRPs, but may still not be able of turning a majority of false published findings
into a minority (“...the pure gold standard is unattainable.” p. 700, Ioannidis, 2005).
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Tests serve as a means for making short-term decisions
about statistical hypotheses, which in turn can each correspond
to an infinitely large number of different substantive process
hypotheses. Such decisions may be highly fallible due to the
occurrence not only of bias and QRPs but also of inadvertent
technical and data processing errors. Even if the effect exists,
moreover, it is expected to not become significant a number of
times (i.e., the power never equals one), and the false negative rate
may even be higher than the false positive rate (cf, Fiedler et al.,
2012). No conclusion about non-significant effects can be drawn
either way, and probably a preference for the initial hypothesis
should be kept (cf, Dienes, 2014). Even if it becomes significant
moreover, the finding may frequently be false (i.e., without any
bias or QRPs; Ioannidis, 2005). Stroebe et al. (2012) were equally
pessimistic about the self-corrective power in psychology and
other fields of science (e.g., even physics), but limited their
analysis to scientific fraud cases for which they noted that short-
term self-correction by replication and peer review did not seem
to work. Confirmatory research practices would thus only filter
out a percentage of false findings (and miss many “true” findings),
but the remainder probably requires a longer and more gradual
process of theoretical considerations and comparisons to other
findings.
I would argue that self-correction in science, also of bona-fide
but false claims, mostly does not result from active discussions or
confirmatory research, but from a more passive quasi-Darwinian
selection of ideas and hypotheses working on longer time
scales (e.g., generations of scientists). Evolutionary development
probably represents the most powerful optimization process
available, and may well also apply to science (cf, Holland,
1975; Dawkins, 1986). The above fallibility of statistical tests
severely limits their contribution to the quasi-evolutionary
selection process. More often, false hypotheses are ignored
in the long run (i.e., become “extinct”), whereas hypotheses
that are more consistently supported by the evidence and fit
in ongoing discussions have higher chances of survival and
reproduction. The single-experiment support or rejection of a
statistical hypothesis in the purely confirmatory view can better
be replaced by a multi-experiment weighing of psychological
hypotheses, which can be represented as different levels of a
theoretically motivated moderator variable in a meta-analysis
(cf, Ioannidis, 2005). Even after a meta-analysis, one cannot be
completely sure that one’s decisions about particular hypotheses
are “true.” This is also not too dissimilar from the optimization
process performed by evolution. Scientific development can also
get stuck in local optima, not being able to reach even fitter
solutions.
Replication studies conforming to confirmatory standards
may still be useful instruments, as long as they are sufficiently
theoretically informed. In a purely mechanical view on
replication, however, researchers try to reproduce statistical
outcomes of tasks rather than predictions of well-specified
theories (cf, Klein, 2014). These replicators run the risk of
neglecting important moderators that may also not have been
recognized explicitly in the initial, to-be-replicated study. Such
a hidden variable may inadvertently have been set to different
values in the original and the replication studies, which can
even lead to opposing outcomes. If in this case falsification is
erroneously concluded from non-replication, this may hamper
the development of science rather than fostering it. It is
certainly true that the hidden moderators invoked by non-
replicated researchers may sometimes appear trivial (e.g., testing
in cubicles), and unrelated to theory (for this critique, see Yong,
2012; Klein, 2014), but I will discuss an example of a non-
replication where these variables could have been derived a priori
from prominent theories in the field. The non-replication by
Matzke et al. (2015) of Saccade-Induced Retrieval Enhancement
(SIRE; e.g., Lyle et al., 2008) seems to suffer from such a
theoretical neglect. Determining whether the initial result or the
non-replication is “false” does not seem possible by statistical tests
alone, but also requires consideration of the underlying process
hypotheses and their associated hidden variables.
EYE MOVEMENTS, MEMORY, AND
EMOTION
Two main fields of eye movement (EM) research, sharing an
interest on memory processing after short periods of EMs, were
linked by Matzke et al. (2015). SIRE investigates the enhancement
of predominantly emotionally neutral memories after executing
EMs (e.g., Lyle et al., 2008). Eye Movement Desensitization
and Reprocessing therapy (EMDR; Shapiro, 1989) deals with
the emotional processing of traumatic and anxious memories
due to EMs (e.g., Armstrong and Vaughan, 1996; Lee and
Cuijpers, 2013). The original SIRE studies did not refer to EMDR,
although the eye manipulation, involving a 30 s period of EMs
at a 1 s pace, was very similar to the therapeutic procedure.
The to-be-retrieved material, moreover, did not consist of
traumatic memories, as in EMDR therapy, but of low-to-medium
frequency, largely affectively neutral, words.
In contrast to the growing confidence in the effectiveness
of EMDR (e.g., van den Hout and Engelhard, 2012; Lee and
Cuijpers, 2013), the evidence for SIRE has suffered from the
non-replication by Matzke et al. (2015). These authors joined
in an adversarial-collaboration replication study as proponents
or skeptics of SIRE and could not reproduce the memory
enhancement obtained by Lyle et al. (2008). Bayesian statistics
revealed that the observed data were 15 times more likely under
H0 (i.e., no difference) than under H1 (i.e., a difference in
memory performance between eye manipulation conditions).
The proponents in this study were not convinced by this single
failure to replicate, but the skeptics even raised the possibility
of bias and QRPs on the side of the SIRE research community
to explain the initial finding. This conclusion does not seem
warranted due to the high rate of false positives (cf, Ioannidis,
2005) and false negatives (cf, Fiedler et al., 2012) even in the
absence of bias and QRPs. In addition, it disregards theoretical
reasons for the discrepancy.
Only one account for SIRE was considered in the non-
replication (i.e., the hemispheric interaction hypothesis; Lyle
et al., 2008, 2012), which had previously been dismissed by the
proponents in the adversarial collaboration (Samara et al., 2011).
Other influential accounts, primarily for EMDR, such as the
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working memory account (Andrade et al., 1997) or the orienting
response account (Armstrong and Vaughan, 1996; Stickgold,
2002), as well as the newer top-down attentional control account
from the SIRE domain (Edlin and Lyle, 2013; Lyle and Edlin,
2015) were completely ignored. Elsewhere (Phaf, submitted), I
have identified crucial hidden variables based on the linking of
theoretical accounts for SIRE and EMDR that may well explain
the contrast between the original SIRE findings and the non-
replication.
Two variables suggest themselves from the application of
EMDR accounts to SIRE. Neither the retrieval, and re-imagining,
during EMs, nor the emotionality of the memories were deemed
important in SIRE research. Matzke et al. (2015) even explicitly
suppressed the former influences by including a recency buffer
at the end of the study list, and moreover strictly selected for
affectively neutral words. Because Lyle et al. (2008, 2012) had the
EMs performed immediately after study, some recently presented
words may still have been active during the EMs. Also the
absence of selection for neutrality here meant that there could
have been an unknown proportion of negative words in the
list. In a non-preregistered (i.e., exploratory, in the statistical
classification of Wagenmakers et al., 2012) study an explicit
retrieval instruction during the eye manipulation, and the strict
selection of negative material, has strongly amplified memory
enhancement, far exceeding the effect sizes commonly reported
for SIRE (Phaf, submitted). However, also this experiment cannot
yield conclusive evidence concerning the crucial hidden factors,
but should be followed up by further research that explicitly
compares instructions to re-imagine with attempts to suppress
such retrieval. The control over, or lack of, or attempts to
actively suppress, memory re-activation during EMs could then
serve as a moderator variable in meta-analyses of SIRE. The
valence of the studied material, as well as the absence of
control over valence, could be another moderator variable. To
corroborate the present hypotheses, the largest effect sizes should
be obtained with memory (re-activation) during EMs and for
negative material. Instead of getting bogged down in a statistical
impasse, such, probably exploratory, research would eventually
advance our understanding of SIRE and may even help to
improve EMDR.
REPLICATION REQUIRES THEORY
Statistical testing is not a goal in itself in Psychology, but the
development of theory is. The confirmatory type of research
proposed by Wagenmakers et al. (2012) tries to validate the
statistical tests, but does not necessarily provide meaning to the
results. Without a theoretical specification of the hypotheses even
significant findings can mean anything, and their application
(e.g., in case of practical interventions) may remain “magical”
(as has been argued for EMDR, McNally, 1999). The non-
replication of Matzke et al. (2015) provides an example of not
sufficiently addressing theory. Process hypotheses could have
been derived here not only from EMDR but also from other
potential sources (e.g., visual attention, working memory). This
a-theoretical stance is fostered by an over-reliance on statistical
tests. The practice of only describing test statistics but not actual
results (e.g., means and measures of variance) in results sections
of research papers (e.g., many studies had to be excluded for
this reason from the meta-analysis of Phaf et al., 2014) further
illustrates the frequent prioritization of mechanical statistical
testing over theoretical analysis. The emphasis in these papers
should shift from establishing that “something is there” to
estimating and explaining what exactly is happening in the
results.
Too often statistical testing acts as a stop criterion, which
consists of the simple decision rule that an effect is there if
it is significant and not there if it is non-significant, taken
to indicate that no further theoretical analysis is needed. The
non-replication of Matzke et al. (2015) may have reached this
stop criterion even earlier, not after the tests were performed
but in the initial stage when the tests were planned and
preregistered. Even more theoretical work is required, however,
after non-significance than after significance. If one considers
a theoretical hypothesis to be refuted by non-significance, a
superior alternative should always be formulated according to
modern philosophy of science (e.g., Lakatos, 1970). There can
be no hypothesis abandonment without hypothesis replacement.
The utilization of the stop criterion distinguishes mechanical
replication attempts of statistical hypotheses from theoretically
informed replication attempts of substantive hypotheses. Some
researchers even use it as a tool for relieving them from the
burden of having to delve into a largely confusing abundance
of prior findings and hypotheses. The stop criterion frequently
results in what Ioannidis (2005) calls the Proteus phenomenon
that squarely contradicting, but both significant, sets of results
are published shortly after another, sometimes even in the same
journal, without referring to the other. The opposing findings are
not necessarily caused by bias or QRPs in one of the studies,
but may simply reflect the majority of bona-fide significant
findings being false, as Ioannidis argues. Another unfortunate
consequence of this criterion is that the same research is often
repeated over and over again (i.e., “the wheel is reinvented”),
sometimes with slight modifications or (e.g., neuro-imaging)
additions, while the researchers remain unaware of previous
work. Due to the frequent application of the statistical stop
criterion for theoretical analysis, psychology often does not seem
to learn from its own research.
In terms of substantive hypotheses, classical null hypothesis
statistical testing performs a kind of inverse, rather than direct,
falsification. Instead of trying to falsify a concrete hypothesis,
one tries to establish evidence against being nothing there.
After rejecting the null hypothesis, one claims that this rejection
supports one’s proposed hypothesis, which may take any form
other than the null. The H1 thus extends to an infinite range
of theories, and could better be renamed H∞ to recognize
the theoretical indifference of this hypothesis. This contrasts
sharply with the dominant falsification practice in for instance
physics. Here a non-trivial hypothesis is disconfirmed when the
values predicted by theory fall outside the uncertainty interval
around the observed results (e.g., Taylor, 1982). This approach
compares predicted and actual results and concludes to non-
falsification in the absence rather than presence of a difference.
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The physics approach to data analysis also entails more attention
for measurement accuracy than in psychology. Non-significance
in classical null hypothesis statistical testing more often indicates
a lack of measurement accuracy than an absence of difference,
however small it may be (cf, Cohen, 1990). Physical theories are
undoubtedly among the most numerical and highly developed in
the whole of science, and therefore probably better suited to this
approach than psychological theories. The rigid application of
statistical hypothesis-testing, however, seems to have aggravated
the neglect of theory in psychology.
A single-experiment just cannot serve to decide conclusively
whether a claim is false or not (cf, Hauer, 2004; Ioannidis,
2005). It merely adds weight, proportional to the accuracy of its
measurements, to one or the other position. A publication of
a new effect should be considered suggestive, but certainly not
definitive “proof” (cf, Phaf et al., 2014). In the words of Medawar
(1991): “In the outcome science is not a collection of facts
or of unquestionable generalizations, but a logically connected
network of hypotheses which represent our current opinion
about what the real world is like.” (p. 98) Scientific exaggeration
is often required by funding agencies for research marketing
purposes (also called “valorization” at Dutch universities), but
may induce QRPs and even fraud. Scientific prudence and
modesty seem better ways to reach a durable development of
science. Confirmatory researchers may inadvertently add to this
exaggeration, because they are inclined to think of science as
collecting conclusive, sometimes even “proven,” facts, whereas
history has shown it to consist of ongoing discussions with
continuous weight shifts between alternative hypotheses (cf,
Lakatos, 1970).
If null hypothesis statistical testing detracts from psychological
hypotheses and even induces a false sense of certainty, why
not abandon null hypothesis statistical testing altogether (cf,
Cumming, 2014)? The reporting of only effect sizes and
confidence intervals (CIs) may actually reduce publication bias,
because the latter is based more often on significance levels than
on effect sizes (cf, Simonsohn et al., 2014). In addition, these
estimation statistics are more informative, because they, similar
to physics, focus on what the effect is rather than on what it
is not. CIs should be used as an indication of measurement
accuracy rather than for making decisions on whether some
unspecified “effect” is there or not (e.g., contains zero; see
Gardner and Altman, 1986). The latter decisions are highly
fallible (a majority is probably “false,” see Ioannidis, 2005; Fiedler
et al., 2012), and we need other, more theoretical, arguments to
determine the level of support for a hypothesis provided by a
set of results. Stronger, but still not infallible, conclusions can
better be postponed until after meta-analyses on the proposed
hypotheses have been performed (Schmidt, 1996). These meta-
analyses have the additional advantage of identifying publication
bias and being able to correct for it with the Trim-and-Fill
method (Duval and Tweedie, 2000), or possibly with the p-curve
method (Simonsohn et al., 2014). Only when effect size and the
extent of publication bias can be judged in a meta-analysis, one
can have more confidence in a finding.
The primary aim of this comment is to juxtapose the
statistically oriented approach and a more theoretically oriented
approach. The statistical approach of Wagenmakers et al.
(2012) entails a two-way classification in either exploratory or
hypothesis-confirmatory research. The latter type can only have
a binary outcome with respect to the decision being made, the
hypothesis is either confirmed or not. To arrive at such an
outcome, a replication attempt must rely on the original research
having uncovered and made explicit all relevant processes (i.e.,
an exhaustive theoretical analysis). All other types of research
fall in the exploratory category, even when they further develop
the theory starting from quite specific hypotheses. Merely
confirming preregistered hypotheses has, however, never yielded
new hypotheses, whereas unexpected findings stimulating further
investigations do have that capacity and may even be the royal
road to scientific innovation (e.g., Lehrer, 2009). Calling it
undirected exploratory research, moreover, also does not do
justice to the gradual progress-by-adjustment type of research
(cf, Lakatos, 1970). The latter type of research is often guided
by well-specified and concrete process hypotheses, which may
be far superior above merely expecting a difference. Although I
think we should try to move away from null hypothesis statistical
testing (cf, Cumming, 2014), in the meantime a statistical
approach to experimental psychology should become more
theoretically oriented and include a third category: hypothesis-
guided research.
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